Technical breakdown
onchain
Fee split — the whole fee
Each acquisition escrows priceEscrowed = EV × 1.10, where EV is the harmonic mean of all backings (H = weightedBackingTotal ÷ totalWeight). Settlement splits the whole escrowed fee — not merely the 10% surcharge: a re-routed slice, then the 1% owner cut, then the crown tithe, and the rest is shared equally across every active listing. Yield per position is independent of its size.
Settlement — the 1.176 threshold
The standing bid is 85% of backing. A purchaser keeps the NFT when it is worth more than that payout, i.e. B < 1.176 × V. On the keep branch the depositor gets 0.99 × B; on the sell branch the purchaser takes 0.85 × B and — retainedToProtocol = true live — the 15% goes to the protocol. Calibrating B = 1.10 × floor keeps the book on the keep branch.
The crown
A single topListingId carries a running topListingPot. A tithe on every acquisition accrues to it; a challenger seizes it only by clearing the top by 10% (topThresholdBps = 1000), and lowering backing forfeits it. Being the largest-backed position, it is also the least likely to be drawn.
Valuation & $FWA
NAV = committed backing + free ETH + accrued $FWA discounted by a liquidity haircut. $FWA cannot be transferred to third parties — it is realisable only by selling into the FWA v4 pool (always open even while external buys are disabled), so the mark is deliberately conservative.
Redemption queue
Backing ETH is locked inside a live position until it is selected and settled, so redemptions queue. The exit gate (_requireExitUnlocked) only blocks a re-price while an acquisition is pending and within maxCallbackDelayBlocks (~1.5 min) of the last selection — a short, self-clearing gate, not a wait behind the 24h / 7d settlement windows. The real latency is inventory turnover.
- Tithe is 1%, not 5%.
topListingShareBpsis live-set to100, not the repo default 500. The crown edge is 5× weaker as a standalone alpha source; aggregate depositor yield is unchanged (the tithe is a reallocation, and the vault holds the crown anyway). - Surcharge is split hot/cold. A slice of the 10% surcharge is re-routed to the purchaser's $FWA buy allowance under cold (infrequent-acquisition) conditions. The depositor fee coefficient interpolates between
1.089·B(hot) and0.990·B(fully cold) — below1·B. Viability is a direct function of acquisitions/day keeping the pool hot. - Sell branch is worse than a 15% haircut. With
retainedToProtocol = true, a mis-calibrated sell surrenders the whole backing (85% purchaser / 15% protocol) and leaves the depositor holding only the NFT — a fullB − Vloss that cycle, not 0.15·B.
85% of backing, so the branch flips at B = V ÷ 0.85. The estate targets 1.10× rather than 1.176× to absorb a floor drawdown of about 6% without crossing it, because withdrawals queue behind open VRF requests and cannot be made instantly.topListingId with a running pot. A challenger seizes it only when backing·BPS ≥ topBacking·(BPS + 1000), and lowering backing forfeits it. The estate sizes the crown position at a fixed multiple of the second-largest deposit and re-tops it on challenge.1e36 ÷ backing, so lifetime is geometric and memoryless with CV = 1. Across n independent positions dispersion falls as 1/√n. The estate holds no more than 25% of backing in any one collection.EV × 1.10 where EV is the harmonic mean of all backings. Yield per position is independent of its size, so the estate favours the cheapest liquid eligible floors: annualised return scales with acquisitions ÷ (positions × backing).